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Abstract 
 
 
 
Using a unique dataset of private equity funds over the last two decades, this paper analyzes the 
investment behavior of private equity fund managers. Based on recent theoretical advances, we 
link the timing of funds’ investment and exit decisions, and the subsequent returns they earn on 
their portfolio companies, to changes in the demand for private equity in a setting where the 
supply of capital is ‘sticky’ in the short run. We show that existing funds accelerate their 
investment flows and earn higher returns when investment opportunities improve and the 
demand for capital increases. Increases in supply lead to tougher competition for deal flow, and 
private equity fund managers respond by cutting their investment spending. These findings 
provide complementary evidence to recent papers documenting the determinants of fund-level 
performance in private equity. 
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1. Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to try and better understand how private equity funds (‘PEF’s) make 
investment decisions in a competitive market. How competition affects the private equity sector is an 
interesting question because it involves the interaction of three distinct economic agents – investors, 
financial intermediaries (i.e., PEFs) and entrepreneurs. Our paper complements a recent literature that 
looks at this question theoretically, most notably Inderst and Mueller (2003). With specific reference to 
PEFs, Inderst and Mueller show how changes in demand and supply affect (i) the valuation and 
success of PEFs’ investments, and (ii) the search time and screening by PEFs with respect to their 
investments. In this paper, we investigate some of these issues empirically by documenting the 
microeconomics of the investment behavior of private equity fund managers when faced with different 
economic environments. 
Specifically, we analyze the role of competition among PEFs and the stickiness with which the 
PEF market adjusts to demand shocks in the context of four questions: What determines (i) the speed 
with which PEFs invest their capital over time, (ii) how long it takes them to return capital to their 
investors, (iii) when they exit their portfolio investments, and (iv) what returns they earn on their 
portfolio companies? For this, we make use of a unique and proprietary dataset made available to us by 
one of the largest institutional investors in private equity. Our dataset includes, among other items, 
precisely dated cash flows representing investments in 3,800 portfolio companies by several hundred 
private equity funds. The dataset accounts for approximately 20% of all capital raised by PEFs over the 
period 1981 to 2001 and so affords a comprehensive view of investment behavior in the private equity 
fund industry.  
Our dataset has two important advantages over others used in the literature. First, because we know 
the exact timing of the cash flows (and thus the timing of both the investment and exit decision), we 
are able to relate PEF managers’ decisions to measures of market competition and investment 
opportunities that are distinct from each other. Employing these measures, we find evidence consistent 
with the importance of changes in the demand for private equity capital and stickiness in its supply for 
explaining the observed behavior of PEF managers. For example, we show that time variation in the 
availability of investment opportunities and competition for deal flow with other private equity funds 
significantly affect the time a fund takes to invest its committed capital and then return it to its 
investors. 
The second advantage is that we are able to document not only aggregate PEF behavior at the fund 
level, but also the individual investment decisions within a PEF’s portfolio. Therefore, we are able to 
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analyze the determinants of how long it takes PEFs to exit their investments, that is, the length of the 
‘holding period’ for each portfolio company. Similarly, we analyze the returns that PEFs earn on each 
of their portfolio holdings. We show that holding periods are shorter and the corresponding success 
rates are higher following improvements in the availability of investment opportunities. Analogously, 
investments are held for longer, and are less successful, when competition for deal flow is tougher. We 
argue that this is consistent with an underlying model for imperfect competition among PEFs, and that 
it relates closely to implications from Inderst and Mueller (2003). 
Our paper adds to several well-documented empirical facts from an emerging literature on private 
equity that begins to piece together the interaction of PEFs with the rest of the economy. First, 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) document that aggregate flows into the private equity sector tend to be 
driven by demand shocks. Second, Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Kaplan and Stein (1993) argue and 
document that too much capital can flow into the PEF sector, leading to a ‘money chasing deals’ 
phenomenon. Third, Kaplan and Schoar (2003) document that better performing funds have an easier 
time raising capital for follow-on funds and that follow-on funds perform better than the overall pool 
of funds. We argue that our findings are consistent with these facts in the context of a model for 
imperfect competition among PEFs. 
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we describe a framework for understanding 
competition in the PEF sector and discuss several empirical implications. Because the dataset is new, 
Section 3 describes in detail its various properties. Of some interest, we provide a comparison of our 
sample of PEFs to the larger (albeit much less detailed) Venture Economics dataset used by other 
authors. Sections 4 and 5 provide the core results of the paper by documenting the investment patterns 
of private equity funds over the last 20 years. In Section 4, we investigate the key determinants of the 
investment and exit decisions of PEFs at the fund level. Section 5 provides results on PEFs’ exit 
strategies at the individual investment level and documents their ‘hit’ rates with a corresponding 
analysis of the determinants of investment-level returns. Section 6 suggests a potential important area 
of future research that ties into ours and existing results in the PEF literature. 
2. Framework: The Competitive Market for PEFs 
Consider the market for private equity. PEFs raise money from institutional and other investors and 
channel it to entrepreneurs. PEFs are typically structured as limited partnerships with a fixed (usually 
ten-year) life and thus resemble closed-end funds. The so called general partners or GPs managing the 
fund receive an annual fee of around 1-2% of capital under management and take a slice of the fund’s 
profits (the carried interest or carry), typically 20%. Investors (the limited partners or LPs) commit 
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capital to the fund which GPs draw down over the fund’s life whenever they wish to invest in a 
portfolio company. 
We assume that the institutions and individuals who wish to invest in private equity funds supply 
their capital competitively. Thus, if this asset market is rational, investors will provide capital to PEFs 
until their risk-adjusted expected returns (net of fees) equal the expected returns they could earn 
elsewhere. The PEFs in turn invest in entrepreneurial projects. Positive net present value projects 
correspond to business plans that produce competitive advantage. Though entrepreneurs eventually 
face competition in the product market, they are at least initially monopolists with respect to their 
business plans.  
In this setting, what type of investment behavior and returns do we expect to observe among 
private equity funds? This depends on how competitively PEFs supply their capital to entrepreneurs. 
Assume first that there is perfect, frictionless competition among the PEF managers who wish to invest 
in particular entrepreneurial projects, and suppose a technological shock hits the entrepreneurial 
market. This shock could be the development of the personal computer, changes in the way the FDA 
approves drugs, the development of the internet, the creation of the high-yield debt market, and so 
forth. Conditional on the shock, entrepreneurs demand capital from the market. The literature argues 
that private equity funds are the cheapest source of financing when private firms are subject to extreme 
informational asymmetries and high degrees of uncertainty (e.g., Gompers and Lerner (1999b)). In a 
perfect world, capital would flow immediately into PEFs which in turn would provide capital to the 
entrepreneurs. This story of supply responding to changes in demand is consistent with Gompers and 
Lerner (1998) who argue that most flows into and out of PEFs are driven by demand shocks. 
To the extent that there are net present value gains, the excess returns would likely accrue to the 
entrepreneur. This follows from the assumption that investors will supply capital to PEFs until their 
risk-adjusted expected returns equal the opportunity cost of capital. Presumably, the services PEFs 
provide to entrepreneurs are fully compensated for by the stakes they take in the ventures, which in 
turn are offset by the fees paid to the PEFs by the investors.1 (See, for example, Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989), Palepu (1990), Gompers and Lerner (1999b), and Hellmann and Puri (2002) for the types of 
specialized services that PEFs provide to entrepreneurs.) Thus, investors and PEF managers would 
break even in expectation, and no firm predictions about investment behavior can be made. 
                                                           
1 Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) argue that, due to the principal-agent problems associated with private equity investing, 
PEFs necessarily hold undiversified positions. Thus, part of the compensation to PEFs relates to the level of idiosyncratic 
risk faced by fund managers. 
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There are strong reasons, however, to question this idealized view of the PEF market. In the Inderst 
and Mueller (2003) model, the entrepreneur’s bargaining power relative to the venture capitalist varies 
with changes in the demand and supply of capital. If the supply of PEFs in the short run is somewhat 
fixed, then a sudden shift in the demand for entrepreneurial capital will lead to a transfer of rents from 
the entrepreneur to existing PEFs (and their investors2) until the supply of PEFs catches up (see also 
Sahlman (1990)).  
The stickiness of the PEF market is not without justification. First, relative to other asset classes, it 
is well known that private equity investments are illiquid. That is, there is no active secondary market 
for such investments, investors have little control over how their capital is invested, and the investment 
profile covers a long horizon. If the supply of available capital that puts zero price on liquidity is 
limited, then this will lead to rent transfers from the entrepreneur.3 Second, once a fund has been 
raised, its size cannot subsequently be increased (though in recent years some funds have cut their 
size). Thus, reacting to an increase in demand requires raising a new fund which at minimum takes 
several months. Third, and perhaps more important, it is often argued that PEF managers possess 
unique skills that are not easily duplicated overnight. This limits established GPs’ ability to raise 
additional funds (to avoid overstretch) and constrains to some extent entry by new fund managers. The 
skills in question include the ability to screen investment proposals and monitor entrepreneurs (both 
indirectly and directly through sitting on companies’ boards), a ‘rolodex’ of contacts who can help add 
value to the ventures, and access to financing (e.g., Gompers (1995), Gompers and Lerner (1996), 
Lerner (1994), and Hellmann and Puri (2002)). The contacts in particular are built up through years of 
experience and working in the industry. 
Some argue that there is an additional imperfection in the PEF market. At times, too much capital 
flows into the PEF sector, so that capital investment can actually overshoot, leading to the ‘money 
chasing deals’ phenomenon documented by Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Kaplan and Stein (1993), 
and studied in a specific example by Sahlman and Stevenson (1986). This apparent breakdown of 
efficiency on the investor side is usually considered behavioral (see, for example, the herding literature 
and, in particular, Wermers (1999) for his application to mutual funds). However, it could simply 
                                                           
2 Who ultimately earns the excess rents would depend on the contractual arrangements between the PEF and the investors. 
To the extent that there is little variation across contracts, investors earn some of the excess returns. Excess returns may be 
offset by poor returns if the investor mis-times the cycle (see below). Alternatively, it has been argued that there exist 
subtle, yet important, differences across PEF contracts (e.g., Gompers and Lerner (1999a)). 
3 Recent work by Lerner and Schoar (2003) argues that incentive problems between PEFs and investors can be alleviated by 
the PEF using illiquidity to screen for investors who are less subject to liquidity shocks. For our example, the PEFs would 
need to trade off the benefits of having liquid investors versus the shortage of such investors.  
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reflect investors trying to take advantage of the stickiness of the PEF market, which makes excess 
returns possible. If the technological shock is unpredictable, then the returns earned in ‘sticky’ markets 
and in ‘money chasing deals’ markets may average out to be normal rates of return. This is an 
important area of research which we discuss in greater detail in the paper’s conclusion. 
Of course, these two views of the PEF market are entirely mutually consistent. A technological 
shock hits the entrepreneurial market, leading to an initial shortage of PEF-based capital and high 
returns, only to be supplemented (perhaps overly so) with new PEF capital once the market adjusts. 
Note that this is also a direct result of equilibrium in the Inderst and Mueller (2003) model. 
This framework has implications both for how investment decisions are made and for their relative 
success. Consider a fund manager’s investment behavior following a technological shock, in a world 
where the supply of private equity capital is sticky in the short run. Ceteris paribus, the manager of a 
fund that is already in place should invest his capital as fast as possible in promising projects, before 
new PEFs are created to invest in the same opportunities. Thus a PEF’s investment rate should increase 
as more promising investment opportunities arise. These investments should also yield higher returns. 
On the other hand, holding the number of projects fixed, an increase in competition for deal flow 
among the PEFs makes it harder for the fund manager to find the so-called ‘diamonds in the rough’, 
leading to a slow-down in the investment rate. This effect corresponds to Inderst and Mueller’s (2003) 
prediction that the PEF manager’s search time increases when competition intensifies. Greater 
competition presumably also implies that the fund manager will find it more difficult to extract rents 
from the entrepreneur. A manager trying to maximize the returns on the fund’s investments will then 
take longer to invest the fund’s capital to avoid overpaying.4 
In terms of capital return and exit decisions, we expect that funds that faced tough competition 
when making their investments will take longer to return capital to their investors and exit their 
portfolio holdings later. In part this follows because, as mentioned above, funds take longer to invest 
when competition is tough. Moreover, we expect funds facing tough competition to make more 
marginal investments which need more ‘nursing’ before they can be exited, and which arguably have 
higher mortality rates (see Bengtsson, Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg (2002) for evidence that VCs 
screen less when competition for deal flow is intense). Improvements in the investment environment 
(say in response to technological shocks), on the other hand, should serve to accelerate both capital 
                                                           
4 Alternatively, one might model the effects of changes in demand when supply is fixed in the short run using a two-
equation demand/supply model. However, like other researchers, we lack data on the prices (valuations) paid for private 
equity stakes and so cannot identify such a system. Fortunately, our results are consistent with the demand/supply 
predictions outlined in this Section. 
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returns at the fund level and exits at the investment level. 
A corollary of this analysis is that PEFs that can react quickly to market conditions, say by being 
able to raise funds on short notice, would have a comparative advantage. Along these lines, Kaplan and 
Schoar (2003) find that better performing funds have an easier time raising capital for follow-on funds. 
Interestingly, their comprehensive analysis of the performance of 746 PEFs raised between 1980 and 
1995 shows that (i) follow-on funds perform better than the overall pool of funds, and (ii) funds raised 
in boom times (i.e., with considerable PEF competition) tend to perform worse. These results are 
consistent with the notion of a competitive advantage and show support for the model of the private 
equity market described above. We will return to the implications of our analysis for who earns excess 
returns in the private equity market in the concluding section. 
3. Sample and Data 
3.1 Overview of Dataset 
Our dataset is derived from the records of one of the largest institutional investors in private equity 
in the U.S. We will refer to this investor as the ‘Limited Partner’. As a condition for obtaining the data, 
we have agreed to identify neither the Limited Partner nor the names of the funds or portfolio 
companies in the dataset. The Limited Partner began investing in private equity in 1981, in the wake of 
the institutionalization of the private equity industry following the 1980 ERISA ‘Safe Harbor’ 
regulation, and has since invested in hundreds of funds, all of which are included in our analysis.5 The 
funds, in turn, have invested in 3,800 portfolio companies. The number of funds the Limited Partner 
participated in increased throughout the 1990s, peaking in 1999-2000, similar to the pattern 
documented for PEFs in general by Venture Economics (VE), a commercial data vendor.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. To protect the Limited Partner’s identity, we 
have agreed not to disclose in this table certain characteristics of funds raised after 1993, such as their 
number and average size, as these are still active investments. (However, we include the underlying 
cash flow data for all funds in our subsequent analyses.) The table thus contains more complete 
information for the 73 private equity funds the Limited Partner invested in between 1981 and 1993. 
We define these funds as ‘mature’ funds since they are around ten or more years old and have 
completed their investment activity and capital distributions.  
                                                           
5 The institutionalization of the private equity industry is commonly dated to three events: the 1978 Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) whose ‘Prudent Man’ rule allowed pension funds to invest in higher-risk asset classes; the 
1980 Small Business Investment Act which redefined PEF managers as business development companies rather than 
investment advisers, so lowering their regulatory burdens; and the 1980 ERISA ‘Safe Harbor’ regulation which sanctioned 
limited partnerships which are now the dominant organizational form in the industry. 
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Our dataset contains both venture capital and buyout funds.6 For the entire period from 1981 to 
2001, a quarter of funds, representing 14.8% of fund capital, are venture funds. This differs from the 
more comprehensive sample of funds tracked by VE, where venture funds account for 41.5% by 
capital. Our Limited Partner thus invests disproportionately in buyout funds.  
In the private equity industry, fund size is usually expressed as the sum of investors’ ‘capital 
commitments’. The capital commitment is the maximum amount of money an investor can be asked to 
contribute over the life of the fund. Between 1981 and 2001, sample funds had aggregate commitments 
of $207 billion (in nominal terms). Mature funds had aggregate commitments of $36.7 billion, with the 
average fund raising $502.8 million. Buyout funds were substantially larger than venture funds, 
averaging capital commitments of $599.7 million versus $227.5 million. Compared to the sample of 
funds tracked by VE, our funds are large: Kaplan and Schoar (2003) report average fund sizes for 
buyout and venture funds of $262 million and $53 million between 1980 and 1995, respectively. 
Our Limited Partner’s investment in the private equity industry is sizeable. Between 1981 and 
2001, it committed $5.5 billion to PEFs, with the median fund receiving $10 million. As a fraction of 
total fund size, the Limited Partner committed 4.7% of the average fund’s capital, making it one of the 
larger investors. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
Apart from being skewed toward larger and buyout funds, how representative is our funds sample? 
First, note that our data are not subject to survivorship bias as all investments the Limited Partner has 
made since 1981 are included. Second, our sample covers a large fraction of the PEF ‘universe’. The 
$207 billion raised in aggregate by our funds represent 17.5% of the $1.184 trillion in aggregate 
commitments in the broader VE sample over the 1981-2001 period (see Table 1). Our coverage is even 
better among buyout funds, accounting for 29.3% of capital committed to those funds. Thus, our 
sample represents a reasonable cross-section of large buyout funds and a smaller cross-section of large 
venture funds. By implication, our results may not be representative of the investment behavior of 
smaller funds. 
Third, the extent to which the funds in our dataset are representative of the universe of private 
equity funds depends in part on the Limited Partner’s investment strategy. For instance, it would be 
problematic if the Limited Partner only invested in follow-on funds raised by managers with proven 
                                                           
6 Venture funds are those identified as ‘Venture Capital’ by Venture Economics. Most non-venture funds are flagged as 
‘Buyout’ (90.4%); the remainder are flagged as ‘Generalist Private Equity’ (3.8%), ‘Mezzanine’ (4.8%), and ‘Other Private 
Equity’ (1%). We will refer to these funds collectively as buyout funds. 
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track records, in the manner of a fund-picking ‘fund-of-funds’ operation. This is not the case. Table 1 
shows that in our dataset, 27.7% of funds raised between 1981 and 2001 are first-time funds, 21% are 
second funds, 11.6% are third funds, and the remaining 39.7% are later funds. Among mature funds 
raised before 1994, as many as 34.8% are first-time funds, a rate that is not much lower than the 40% 
reported by Kaplan and Schoar (2003) for the VE database. 
In part, the relatively high incidence of first-time funds follows from the Limited Partner’s twin 
investment objectives: not only to obtain the highest risk-adjusted return, but also to increase the 
likelihood that the funds will ‘purchase’ the services our Limited Partner’s corporate parent has to 
offer. Economies of scale in the provision of these services explain our Limited Partner’s tendency to 
invest in larger than average funds. These services are arguably more attractive to first-time funds that 
have yet to build up relationships.  
Fourth, as in all studies with limited samples, the question of selection bias arises. There are two 
possibilities here. The first is that the Limited Partner picked PEFs which were ex post unusual in how 
they invested and distributed capital. For example, with respect to capital returns, perhaps the Limited 
Partner chose more liquid investments (i.e., PEFs that paid off more quickly) or had extraordinary 
fund-picking ability in choosing PEFs that ended up with many more ‘hits’. We tend to discount this 
possibility. As described above, the Limited Partner’s primary motivation for investing in these funds 
was to build relationships for the benefit of its corporate parent. Moreover, we know that the Limited 
Partner is not organized as a professional fund-picking (‘fund-of-funds’) operation. Finally, members 
of the private equity community who have seen our results tell us they look representative. 
The second possibility is that the Limited Partner might be exceptional in that it ‘survived’ these 
past 20 years, so that we observe its data more by virtue of its luck in investing in winner funds than 
because private equity funds were good investments on average. While this point is probably not 
particularly relevant (investing in private equity accounts only for a small part of the Limited Partner’s 
overall business), we can shed more light on it directly by comparing the performance of our funds to 
the performance of the wider VE sample.7 Kaplan and Schoar (2003) report that cash flow IRRs 
averaged 18% among the 746 mature funds raised in 1980-1995 that are covered by VE. In our sample 
of 73 mature (albeit larger) funds, IRRs average 18.13%, which is unlikely to be significantly different.  
3.3 Cash Flows 
The Limited Partner made available to us the complete cash flow records for all its private equity 
                                                           
7 We thank Steve Kaplan for this suggestion. 
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investments up to May 31, 2001. We subsequently obtained additional data up to September 30, 2002 
for 21 funds that were close to maturity, thus increasing the number of funds that have been liquidated 
or are close to liquidation. A typical record consists of the date and amount of the cash flow, the fund 
and portfolio company to which it relates, and the type of transaction. Transaction types include 
‘disbursements’ (investments in portfolio companies) and ‘exits’ (receipt of cash inflows from IPOs or 
trade sales); dividends or interest paid by portfolio companies; annual management fees (typically 1-
2% of committed capital); and (occasional) interest payments on cash held by GPs prior to making an 
investment. The data do not separately record the GPs’ share in a fund’s capital gains (usually 20%), as 
GPs transmit capital gains to investors net of their ‘carried interest’.  
The cash flows involve four types of investment scenarios. 1) Cancelled transactions: a cash call 
followed shortly after by the return of the cash, along with bank interest. 2) Write-offs: cash outflow(s) 
without subsequent cash inflow, or with a subsequent accounting (non-cash) entry flagging a ‘capital 
loss’. 3) Cash distributions following successful exits (in the form of an IPO or a trade sale): cash 
outflow(s) followed by cash inflow(s). And 4), stock distributions following successful exits: cash 
outflow(s) followed by a non-cash entry reflecting receipt of common stock. The stock would be the 
portfolio company’s in the case of an IPO, and the buyer’s in the case of a sale to a publicly traded 
firm. Following a stock distribution, one of two things can happen: the Limited Partner sells the stock, 
or it holds it in inventory. Sales show up as cash inflows. Positions that are held in inventory are 
marked to market periodically (usually monthly), but they are obviously not cash. Upon receipt of 
distributed stock, our Limited Partner virtually always liquidates the distributed stock.  
3.4 Portfolio Compositions and Industry Specializations 
Venture Economics assigns companies to six broad industry groups: ‘Biotechnology’, 
‘Communications and Media’, ‘Computer Related’, ‘Medical/Health/Life Science’, 
‘Semiconductors/Other Electronics’, and ‘Non-High-Technology’. Companies that do not appear in 
VE are assigned manually to these industry groups, using Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar 
Database, SIC codes that are available from standard sources for companies that have gone public, 
verbal information contained in fund reports received by our Limited Partner, and news and web 
searches. 209 companies that cannot be assigned unambiguously to one of the six VE groups are 
assigned to a new ‘Miscellaneous’ group.  
Of the 3,800 companies that our sample funds invested in between 1981 and 2001, 3% are assigned 
to ‘Biotechnology’, 17% to ‘Communications and Media’, 18% to ‘Computer Related’, 7% to 
‘Medical/Health/Life Science’, 4% to ‘Semiconductors/Other Electronics’, 45% to ‘Non-High-
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Technology’, and 6% to ‘Miscellaneous’. The high proportion of non-high-technology portfolio 
companies reflects the large number of buyout funds in the sample. 
Funds rarely invest in only one industry. We take a sample fund’s industry specialization to be the 
broad VE industry group that accounts for most of its invested capital. On this basis, 14% of funds 
specialize in ‘Communications and Media’, 11% in ‘Computer Related’ companies, 4% in 
‘Medical/Health/Life Science’, 3% in ‘Semiconductors/Other Electronics’, and 59% in ‘Non-High-
Technology’. Our sample contains no funds specializing in ‘Biotechnology’. 
4. The Investment and Capital Return Decisions of Private Equity Funds 
There is a large empirical literature on the investment process of private equity funds. However, 
this literature almost exclusively analyzes the contractual relations between PEFs and the firms in their 
portfolios. (See Gompers (1995), Lerner (1994), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), and Hellmann and Puri 
(2002), among others.) In this section, we take contracts as given and instead empirically analyze how 
a private equity fund invests its capital over its life in the context of the descriptive model of the PEF 
market outlined in Section 2. When a PEF receives a capital commitment from investors, the capital is 
not put to use immediately and instead is drawn down only when the PEF is ready to invest in a 
portfolio company. We document the dynamics of these draw downs over a fund’s life, as well as how 
quickly capital gets returned. Of particular importance, we show that there is substantial cross-
sectional variation in draw down rates and capital return rates, and we perform a duration analysis of 
the determinants of how fast or how slowly these flows occur. However, we first document some new 
stylized facts that serve as a backdrop for our analysis. 
4.1 Cash Flow Patterns: Draw Downs and Capital Distributions 
Table 2A shows how much of the committed capital was drawn down by the earlier of the end of 
our sampling period or a fund’s liquidation date. The average fund in our sample has drawn down 
67.3% of committed capital. However, this understates draw downs as the more recent funds are not 
yet fully invested. The 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993 invested on average 94.8% of 
committed capital. Average draw downs are around 90% of committed capital for funds raised up to 
1996, with later vintages still actively investing and so still in what is called the ‘commitment period’.  
It is arguable when a fund is fully invested. Among the funds raised between 1981 and 1993 that 
have subsequently been liquidated, some never invested more than 60 to 70% of committed capital. In 
the overall 1981-2001 dataset, 55.6% of funds have invested at least 70% of committed capital, and 
49.5% have invested 80% or more as of the end of our sampling period. These might reasonably be 
thought of as fully, or close to fully, invested. They include a few recent funds that invested their 
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committed capital very rapidly: 40% of the 1998 vintage funds and 10% of the 1999 vintage funds had 
already invested at least 70% of committed capital by May 2001. 
As mentioned earlier, PEFs rarely draw down their committed capital at the outset, issuing capital 
calls instead when investment opportunities present themselves. Figure 1 sheds light on the time 
profile of draw downs for the average sample fund. The figure shows average cumulative draw downs 
for each year of a fund’s life (counted from 1 to 10), divided by committed capital. The average fund 
draws down 16.28%, 20.35%, and 20.15% of committed capital in its first three years of operation, so 
it is 56.8% invested by the end of year 3. The draw down rate then slows down. In fact, it takes another 
three years to hit a 90% rate. By year 10, the end of its expected life, the average fund is 93.6% 
invested. (While some funds remain in operation beyond year 10, there are no further draw downs.) 
Though not shown in the figure, there is wide variation in the speed with which funds draw down 
committed capital. For instance, some funds draw it down in year 1, while others take as long as ten 
years to invest 80% or more of their commitments. Adjusting for the fact that many of the more recent 
funds are right-censored, in that they drop out of our sample before they are fully invested, the average 
(median) fund takes 11.7 (11) quarters to invest 80% or more of its commitments.  
On the flip side of the draw down decision, following liquidity events (such as an IPO), capital is 
returned to investors in the form of cash distributions or stock distributions. (Private equity funds 
typically have covenants restricting reinvestment of capital gains; see Gompers and Lerner (1996).) 
Table 2B shows how much of the invested and committed capital was returned to investors by the 
earlier of the end of our sampling period or a fund’s liquidation date. The average fund distributed 
106.8% of drawn-down capital and 94.3% of committed capital. Again, this understates cash flows as 
recent funds have yet to exit many of their portfolio holdings. The 73 funds raised between 1981 and 
1993 returned 2.59 times invested capital and 2.45 times committed capital, on average. 
Figure 1 documents the rate at which capital returns and capital gains are distributed to investors 
over the life of the average fund. As one might expect, distributions are rare in the early fund years. 
For example, by the end of year 3, only 12.9% of total committed capital has been distributed on 
average. Note that it takes around seven years for committed capital to be returned, so much of the 
‘capital gain’ is generated from year 7 onwards. By year 10, the average fund has distributed 1.93 
times its committed capital. Some funds have further distributions beyond year 10, which are not 
illustrated in the figure.  
These results have important implications for measuring performance and the liquidity of investing 
in a PEF. Specifically, draw downs (cash outflows) and distributions (cash inflows) are the raw inputs 
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when assessing fund performance, but there is another ingredient: the time profile of cash flows. The 
later the cash outflows, and the sooner the cash inflows, the better is a fund’s performance. Figure 1 
shows that these cash flows occur throughout the life of the fund and thus must be taken into account 
at the time they occur when calculating a fund’s return. This is a useful stylized fact therefore that 
should be incorporated by the literature on PEF performance. 
4.2 The Determinants of Draw Downs 
To shed light on the determinants of how quickly a fund invests its capital, we model the time-to-
fully-invested as ln(ti) = βX + ln(εi), where the error εi is assumed to follow the exponential 
distribution with mean β0, the constant. This is a standard accelerated-time-to-failure model, which is 
perhaps more familiar when rewritten as a proportional-hazard duration model. One advantage of 
failure models is that the likelihood function has no problem correcting for the right-censoring inherent 
in the data (Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980)).8 Thus, we estimate the model using all sample funds 
raised between 1981 and 2001, including those that drop out of the sample before becoming fully 
invested. (Our results are qualitatively unaffected if we restrict the sample to the mature funds raised 
between 1981 and 1993, which are not subject to right-censoring.) 
The model outlined in Section 2 suggests that time-to-fully-invested varies with the (time-varying) 
availability of investment opportunities and competition for such investment opportunities, such that 
funds invest their capital more rapidly when technological and other shocks increase the availability of 
promising ventures and when they face less competition for deal flow. We also allow for potential 
differences between venture and buyout funds, first-time and follow-on funds, and by fund size, and 
control for changes in the cost of capital.  
As our proxy for the unobserved availability of investment opportunities faced by a buyout 
(venture) fund in our sample, we use the quarterly log number of companies in a buyout (venture) 
fund’s industry of specialization that receive buyout (venture) funding according to Venture 
Economics. Funds’ industry specializations are as defined in Section 3.4. For instance, an increase in 
the number of ‘Biotechnology’ companies being funded is assumed to signal an improvement in 
biotech investment opportunities. This variable is time-varying: when investment opportunities (as 
proxied by our variable) change over the life of a sample fund, the fund’s managers can respond by 
accelerating or decelerating the rate at which they invest. Given the framework outlined in Section 2, 
                                                           
8 In the absence of censoring, the likelihood of the data is simply the product of the conditional densities f(ti|β,xi) for all 
observations i. For a censored observation, the time at which ‘failure’ occurs is unknown, as failure occurs after the end of 
the observation period, T. All that is known is that failure hasn’t yet occurred as of time T. The appropriate contribution to 
the likelihood function of a censored observation is therefore the probability of not having failed prior to T.  
  
13
 
the time-varying nature of our proxy for investment opportunities is crucial, as we are interested in 
how investment behavior responds to changes in the demand for private equity when the supply of 
private equity is sticky in the short run.  
We augment this proxy for investment opportunities with a ‘bubble dummy’ that equals one during 
the heyday of the new-economy boom (1999Q1-2000Q2), on the assumption that investment 
opportunities were more abundant in those years. This too is a time-varying covariate: over the fund’s 
life, it equals one only in 1999Q1-2000Q2.9 
To proxy for the degree of competition faced by a buyout (venture) fund in our sample, we 
construct three variables. The first measures how much financial ‘fire power’ the fund’s most direct 
competitors have access to, and is defined as the amount of capital committed to buyout (venture) 
funds in the year the sample buyout (venture) fund was raised, in log dollars of 1996 purchasing 
power. This definition assumes that (say) a 1990 vintage fund competes primarily with other funds of 
that vintage. (Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we widen the window to include capital 
committed in the year before and after the fund’s vintage year.) Note that this variable is not time-
varying and is similar to the proxy used by Gompers and Lerner (2000). 
Our second variable, ‘aggregate per-industry disbursements’, attempts to provide a proxy for 
competition for individual deals. It is defined as the real aggregate amount of capital invested by all 
Venture Economics funds in companies that fall within the sample fund’s industry specialization. For 
instance, a buyout fund specializing in cable company acquisitions (VE group ‘Communications and 
Media’) is treated as facing competition for deal flow from other funds investing in ‘Communications 
and Media’ companies. We measure aggregate per-industry disbursements during a fund’s first three 
years, as Figure 1 shows that this is when funds invest most actively. We expect that funds take longer 
to invest their capital, the more other funds invest in their industry of interest. Note the difference 
between this and our first proxy for competition: while the first proxy is a measure of the fire power 
available to a fund’s competitors, the second is a measure of how much capital competitors are actually 
investing in the fund’s industry of interest.  
The third measure of competition seeks to control for the fact that the private equity market clearly 
grew and developed over the past two decades, becoming more competitive in the sense of greater 
market acceptance of the PEF business model and thus, presumably, lower barriers to entry for new 
funds. This suggests a time trend in the degree of competition existing managers face, with funds 
                                                           
9 Gompers and Lerner (2000) use price/earnings and market/book ratios of public firms in CRSP and Compustat to control 
for industry-specific investment opportunities among private firms, but find neither to be statistically significant. 
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raised earlier facing less competition than those raised in later years. To capture this, we include a 
trend variable that equals the inverse of the square root of the fund’s vintage year, scaled such that 
1981 equals 1 and later years have lower values. Given this definition, we expect a negative coefficient 
for the trend variable.  
We include a number of controls for fund characteristics, specifically the size of the fund (in log 
real dollars), the type of fund (buyout versus venture), and the fund sequence number (first-time versus 
follow-on). We also control for changes in the cost of capital, using two measures: the yield on 
corporate bonds (using Moody’s BAA bond index estimated quarterly in March, June, September, and 
December), and the quarterly return on the Nasdaq Composite Index. Both are time-varying over the 
life of a sample fund.  
Table 3 reports the maximum-likelihood estimation results for three different cut-offs of ‘fully-
invested’ (more than 70%, 80%, or 90% of committed capital).10 The results are qualitatively similar in 
each case. The table also reports models estimated separately for buyout and venture funds using the 
80% cut-off. (Qualitatively similar results, not shown, obtain for the 70% and 90% cut-offs). The 
model χ2 statistics are large and highly significant in the three pooled models as well as in the buyout-
only and venture-only specifications, indicating good overall fit. The pseudo R2 suggest that our 
models capture around a quarter of the variation in draw down rates. 
We first discuss the three models that pool buyout and venture funds. Our proxy for the availability 
of investment opportunities behaves as predicted. The time-varying log number of firms receiving 
financing in a fund’s industry of specialization has a negative and generally significant coefficient, 
suggesting that funds accelerate their draw-downs when investment opportunities in their chosen 
industry improve. This is consistent with the microeconomic analysis of Section 2. The negative 
coefficient estimated for the dummy for the ‘bubble’ years 1999-2000 tells a similar story: funds were 
invested significantly faster in those two years, consistent with our conjecture that investment 
opportunities were more plentiful in 1999 and 2000. To better understand the economic significance of 
these results, consider a one-standard deviation decrease in the number of companies receiving 
financing in the fund’s industry of specialization. The effect on the draw down schedule of the average 
fund is to lengthen the time it takes to invest at least 80% of its capital from 11.7 quarters to 27.5 
quarters, holding all other covariates at their sample means. 
                                                           
10 As mentioned in the previous sub-section, a small number of the mature funds never invested more than 60-70% of their 
capital. For these, we measure time-to-fully invested as the number of quarters until they reached their maximum draw 
down. 
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As conjectured, our first two proxies for competition for deal flow – the total capital raised by other 
PEFs in the fund’s vintage year, and aggregate disbursements by other PEFs into the fund’s main 
industry of interest – have positive and significant effects on the time-to-fully-invested. Thus funds 
take longer to invest when their peers have more money available and when more money is invested in 
their chosen industries. This corroborates Gompers and Lerner’s (2000) hypothesis that the private 
equity market is prone to having ‘too much money chase the same deals’, and confirms the equilibrium 
implications of Inderst and Mueller (2003), in the sense that PEF managers become more cautious 
when competition for deal flow intensifies. The coefficient estimated for the variable capturing the 
time trend in the evolution of the private equity market is negative and significant, suggesting that 
funds raised earlier in the period, when the PEF market was less developed, were invested significantly 
faster. (Note that this finding is not driven by the fact that many newer funds drop out of our sample 
before becoming fully invested, as we have corrected for right-censoring.) To illustrate the economic 
significance of these effects, we consider one-standard deviation increases in the amount of competing 
PEF capital raised and disbursed (measured in log real dollars). All else equal, these increase the time-
to-fully-invested from the average of 11.7 quarters to 24.7 and 17.7 quarters, respectively.  
Among fund characteristics, we find that venture funds take significantly longer to invest than 
buyout funds. We find no evidence that fund sequence number or fund size affect the investment rate. 
Increases in the cost of capital, as measured by the corporate bond yield, serve to reduce draw-down 
rates, indicating that funds invest more slowly as debt becomes more expensive. The effect is fairly 
large economically: all else equal, a one-standard deviation increase in bond yields would increase 
time-to-fully-invested from 11.7 to 29.1 quarters. Conditions in the public equity markets, on the other 
hand, do not influence investment behavior, in view of the insignificant coefficient estimated for the 
return on the Nasdaq Composite Index. Of course, these conditions are above and beyond those 
already captured by our proxies for investment opportunities and competition in the PEF market. 
When we estimate the model separately for buyout and venture funds, we find similar results with 
one exception: aggregate per-industry disbursement, our second proxy for competition for deal flow, 
only has a significant effect on the draw down behavior of buyout funds. Venture funds are relatively 
more sensitive to our first competition proxy, the amount of money available to funds raised in the 
same vintage year. Note that changes in bond yields affect the investment behavior of both VC and 
buyout funds. Conversations with the Limited Partner suggest this effect either captures the fact that 
many venture funds in the sample specialize in ‘growth equity’, which more likely involves debt 
financing, or ‘style drift’ blurring the distinction between venture and buyout funds in the sample.  
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In conclusion, these duration models provide supporting evidence for our hypothesis that fund 
behavior regarding investment decisions is a function of shocks to the availability of investment 
opportunities, lags in the PEF market’s ability to respond to such shocks, and changes in the degree of 
competition for deal flow.  
4.3. The Determinants of Capital Returns 
Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990), Lerner (1994), Gompers (1996), Brav and 
Gompers (2003), Black and Gilson (1998) and others have studied how private equity funds exit their 
portfolio companies. A key finding from this literature is that PEFs act strategically in their exit 
decisions, especially with respect to current exit market conditions and their need to build reputations. 
Our model of the PEF market suggests that competition and investment opportunities may also affect 
exit decisions. In this section, we model how PEFs exit their investments when the PEF market adjusts 
to changes in investment opportunities with a lag and the degree of competition for deal flow varies 
over time. This analysis complements Gompers and Lerner’s (2000) ‘money chasing deals’ analysis, 
which shows that current valuations of portfolio companies are high when there is significant 
competition for deals.  
To shed light on the determinants of how quickly a fund returns capital to its investors, we model 
the log of time (in quarters) between a fund being created and it returning at least M times the 
committed capital to the limited partners, using again accelerated-time-to-failure models.11 We 
experiment with different cut-offs for M, and report estimation results for M=1x, 1.5x, and 2x capital. 
Adjusting for the fact that many of the more recent funds are right-censored, in that they drop out of 
our sample before they have had a chance to return their committed capital, the average (median) fund 
has returned 1x capital after 18.8 (18) quarters, with correspondingly longer periods for the higher cut-
off points.  
What determines capital returns? Having invested their capital, we expect funds to exit their 
portfolio companies (and so return capital to their limited partners) more rapidly, the more public-
market investors are willing to pay for them. Their willingness to pay should increase in the investment 
opportunities available to companies in an industry. Thus we expect faster capital returns, the better are 
investment opportunities. As in Section 4.2, we proxy for investment opportunities using the log 
                                                           
11 We model return of committed rather than invested capital because PEFs do not invest their committed capital instantly. 
To see the difference, consider the example of a fund that has drawn down 20% of commitments by year 2, distributes 25% 
of committed capital following an early ‘home run’ in year 2, but takes until year 5 to invest all its committed capital and 
until year 9 to return it to investors. Time-to-return of ‘invested capital’ would be two years, while time-to-return of 
committed capital would be nine years. The latter is more economically meaningful. 
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number of companies receiving financing in the fund’s chosen industry of specialization. We also 
include a dummy equaling 1 during the heyday of the new-economy boom (1999Q1-2000Q2), on the 
assumption that the exit market was particularly favorable in those two years.  
Funds facing tougher competition for deal flow find it harder to invest – as shown in Section 4.2 – 
which implies that they will also take longer to return capital to their investors. We use the three 
proxies for competition for deal flow introduced earlier: the total capital raised by other PEFs in the 
fund’s vintage year (our measure of fire power), aggregate disbursements by other PEFs into the fund’s 
main industry of interest (our measure of the amount of money chasing similar deals), and the time 
trend variable. 
Finally, we control possible differences across funds by including variables identifying venture and 
first-time funds, respectively, and log fund size. We also control for the effects of variations over time 
in capital market and exit market conditions. We identify and investigate four possible factors: (i) the 
corporate bond yield as a measure of the cost of capital; (ii) the quarterly return on the Nasdaq 
Composite Index, intended to capture the well-documented link between IPO activity and market 
conditions (Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994)); (iii) the quarterly number of private equity-backed 
IPOs in the same broad VE industry, as a signal of how ‘hot’ the IPO market is; and (iv) the quarterly 
number of private equity-backed M&A deals in the same broad VE industry, as a signal of how ‘hot’ 
the M&A market is. Cheap debt, well-performing stock markets, receptive IPO markets and active 
M&A markets should favor faster return of committed capital. 
Table 4 reports maximum-likelihood estimates for the pooled sample using the three cut-offs and 
separately for buyout and venture funds using the 1x cut-off (qualitatively similar results obtain for the 
1.5x and 2x cut-offs). The model χ2 statistics are large and highly significant in all five models, 
indicating good overall fit. The pseudo R2 suggest that our models capture around a half of the 
variation in capital return decisions. 
As predicted, funds return capital significantly faster, the more companies receive financing in a 
fund’s industry of interest. This is true for all cut-offs and for venture funds and buyout funds 
separately. Recall that we interpret an increase in the number of investments as an improvement in 
opportunities and valuations. For example, if the outlook for optical switches improves, we would 
expect more new ventures in the optical switches space to be funded, and at the same time existing 
funds with investments in such companies should find it easier to exit them. To illustrate the economic 
magnitude of the effect, a one-standard deviation increase in the log number of companies receiving 
financing in their chosen industry of specialization would cut the time to returning 1x the committed 
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capital from the average of 18.8 to 4.2 quarters.  
Competition for deal flow leads to slower capital returns, as conjectured. The effect is large 
economically: a one-standard-deviation increase in the variable measuring the amount of capital 
available to same-vintage year funds would delay the return of 1x committed capital by nearly two 
years, from 18.8 to 25.8 quarters. How much competing funds actually invested in a sample fund’s 
chosen industry has a positive effect on time-to-returning capital, but this is significant only in the 
pooled 1x and venture-only specifications. The significantly negative coefficient estimated for the 
trend variable shows that funds raised earlier returned their capital more rapidly, consistent with the 
notion that earlier funds faced a less competitive PEF environment generally.  
Fund characteristics are not generally significant, with one exception: venture funds are 
significantly faster than buyout funds at returning their committed capital. Market conditions also play 
a key role. Both buyout and venture funds return capital faster, the cheaper high-yield debt becomes, 
while venture funds return capital faster, the higher are returns on the Nasdaq Composite Index. Both 
effects are fairly large economically, with one-standard deviation changes in these variables leading to 
reductions from 18.8 quarters to 8.9 and 14 quarters in the pooled sample, respectively. The climate in 
the IPO market has no significant effect, but improved conditions in the M&A market (as measured by 
an increase in the time-varying log number of M&A deals completed in a fund’s industry of 
specialization) lead to a large reduction in the time to returning 1x the committed capital, from the 
average of 18.8 to 11.2 quarters. This effect is concentrated among buyout funds. 
In conclusion, these duration models provide supporting evidence for our hypothesis that fund 
behavior regarding capital return decisions is a function of shocks to the availability of investment 
opportunities, lags in the PEF market’s ability to respond to such shocks, and changes in the degree of 
competition for deal flow, controlling for market conditions.  
5. Portfolio Company-level Analysis of Private Equity Funds  
5.1 The Determinants of Individual Exit Decisions 
Having shown that fund-level decisions regarding capital returns are driven, at least in part, by 
investment opportunities and competition considerations, we now analyze fund behavior regarding 
individual exit decisions at the portfolio-company level. Thus the unit of observation in this section is a 
portfolio company rather than a fund. This provides a micro-level foundation for the analysis in the 
previous section. 
Specifically, to see what determines how quickly a fund exits its investments, we model the log of 
time (in quarters) between a fund investing in a given portfolio company and the fund distributing cash 
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or stock to its limited partners after exiting the investment (typically via an IPO or a sale). Note that 
when a fund exits an investment in several stages, we use the first transaction date. Adjusting for the 
fact that many of the more recent funds are right-censored and that failing investments are never 
exited, the average (median) holding period is 14.4 (12) quarters, with a range from one to 62 quarters.  
As before, we estimate standard accelerated-time-to-failure models using maximum likelihood, 
first pooling all investments and then separately for the portfolio companies of buyout and venture 
funds. We treat investments that are not exited by the earlier of the end of our sample period or the 
tenth anniversary of a fund’s raising as right-censored, with corresponding modifications to the log-
likelihood function. Therefore, we estimate the model using the investments of all sample funds raised 
between 1981 and 2001. (Our results are qualitatively unaffected if we restrict the sample investments 
to those made by the mature funds raised in 1981-1993, which are not subject to right-censoring.)  
We conjecture that holding periods are shorter (investments are exited faster), the better the 
investment environment in terms of available opportunities and the less competition the fund faces. We 
use the same proxies for these determinants as before, except that we measure per-industry 
disbursements by other funds in the quarter an investment was actually undertaken (as opposed to 
during a fund’s first three years of existence). This more directly captures the degree of potential 
competition for the individual investment. The intuition for this proxy is that, holding the number of 
companies funded constant (i.e., investment opportunities), an increase in the amount of money the 
companies receive corresponds to an increase in valuations, all else equal, which is a measure of 
‘money chasing deals’ (Gompers and Lerner (2000)). 
We also control for three fund characteristics and two investment characteristics. First, venture 
funds may have longer holding periods than buyout funds to the extent that they invest in less mature 
companies that require more ‘value-added’ input by the venture capitalists. Second, larger funds may 
have a comparative advantage in seizing favorable exit opportunities, perhaps by virtue of having 
stronger relationships with top IPO underwriters. Third, Gompers (1996) identifies a fund’s sequence 
number as a potentially important factor in the exit decision, with first-time funds having an incentive 
to take companies public too early (‘grandstanding’). Fourth, larger investments potentially have more 
of an impact on a fund’s profitability and IRR, and so may be exited sooner all else equal. Fifth, the 
fund year (counted from 1 to 10) in which an investment was made may influence holding periods to 
the extent that investments undertaken late in a fund’s life need to be unwound when the fund’s limited 
partnership agreement expires (typically after ten years).  
The final, and possibly most important, set of controls relates to market conditions. We use the 
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same four variables as in Table 4: the yield on high-yield corporate bonds, the quarterly return on the 
Nasdaq Composite Index, and conditions in the two primary exit markets: the IPO market and the 
M&A market. The latter two are conditioned on a sample fund’s industry of specialization. For all four 
variables, we expect that PEFs exit their investments faster, the better the market condition (i.e., low 
debt cost, high returns, strong IPO market, and active M&A market). Unlike the fund and industry 
characteristics, market conditions change between the time an investment is undertaken and it is exited.  
Table 5 reports the maximum-likelihood estimation results. The model χ2 statistics are large and 
highly significant in the pooled model as well as in the buyout-only and venture-only specifications, 
and the pseudo-R2 indicate that our models capture a good deal of the variation in holding periods.  
Across all three models, improvements in the investment environment, as captured by our proxy, 
lead to significantly faster exits. In the pooled specification, a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
log number of companies being funded reduces the holding period for the average portfolio company 
by one year, from 14.4 to 10.3 quarters, holding all other covariates in the pooled model constant. 
Consistent with investment opportunities being more plentiful during the heyday of the new-economy 
boom, the significantly negative coefficient estimated for the ‘bubble’ dummy shows that holding 
periods dropped substantially in 1999-2000.  
Competition for deal flow plays an important role in determining a PEF’s exit decisions: holding 
periods are significantly longer when a PEF faces greater competition, as captured by increases in the 
amount of capital available to a fund’s direct competitors and the aggregate amount of money chasing 
deals in the same industry. As for the economic effects, one-standard-deviation increases in the amount 
of capital available to same-vintage-year funds and of capital chasing similar deals increase the 
average holding period in the pooled model from 14.4 to 19.9 and 19 quarters, respectively. In the sub-
sample models, we find the same signs and roughly the same economic effects. Finally, the trend 
variable measuring the evolution of the PEF market has the expected negative coefficient, suggesting 
that funds raised earlier exited their investments faster, ceteris paribus. Again, note that this is not 
driven by right-censoring. 
Among the controls, the most consistent effect comes from investment size: larger holdings are 
exited significantly faster, with a one-standard-deviation increase accelerating the exit decision by two 
and a half quarters in the pooled sample. Since shorter holding periods imply higher IRRs, ceteris 
paribus, this suggests that PEF managers focus their attention on those investments that have the 
largest impact on their fund returns. We also find that venture funds hold their investments 
significantly longer than do buyout funds, consistent with venture investments requiring more time to 
  
21
 
mature. Larger venture funds hold their investments significantly longer, which at first sight is odd: 
larger funds are more likely to hold later-stage investments which ceteris paribus should be exited 
faster. A possible explanation is that larger funds devote less time and attention to each portfolio 
company (assuming VC skills are scarce) which in turn ‘mature’ less quickly. We don’t find any 
significant difference between first-time and follow-on funds, not even among venture funds, despite 
their incentive to ‘grandstand’. 
As one might expect, market conditions are an important determinant of the exit decision. For 
example, as high-yield debt becomes more expensive, exits are delayed. This effect is present both for 
buyout funds, which naturally are tied heavily to the leverage market, and for venture funds, be it 
because they focus on ‘growth equity’ or due to ‘style drift’. Economically, the effect is large: in the 
pooled model, a one-standard deviation increase in bond yields lengthens mean holding periods from 
14.4 to 21.9 quarters. An upturn in IPO activity also accelerates exits, especially among buyout funds, 
with mean holding periods falling from 14.4 to 11 quarters following a one standard deviation increase 
in log IPO volume.12 This provides complementary evidence to Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and 
Vetsuypens (1990) and Lerner (1994) who document in a variety of ways that venture capitalists have 
market timing ability when taking companies public. Our result shows that the length of time they hold 
an investment is a direct function of the IPO market climate. The return on the Nasdaq Composite 
Index and conditions in the M&A market do not influence holding periods. 
5.2 Investment Success 
Our data enable us to calculate investment-level returns for each portfolio company. The preferred 
return metric among private equity practitioners (though not among financial economists) is the 
multiple on investment, defined as abs(cash inflows/invested capital). Multiples give a general idea of 
the success rates of portfolio investments. They range from zero to ∞, with values less than one 
indicating capital losses. Given the nature of our data, multiples are net of the GPs’ carried interest. 
Funds of more recent vintages still hold many unexited investments as of the end of our sample 
period, for which multiples are necessarily zero. We therefore use the 73 mature funds raised between 
1981 and 1993 to provide stylized facts for the investment success of private equity funds. Between 
them, these funds held 1,489 investments. The average portfolio company generated a multiple of 
1.625. The distribution is significantly right-skewed: 54.9% of investments were written off (i.e. zero 
multiples), 14% lost money (i.e. multiples less than one), 11.8% were ‘one-baggers’ (i.e. multiples 
                                                           
12 If we use market-wide IPO activity rather than conditioning IPO volume on Venture Economics industries, the effect 
becomes larger in economic magnitude, without affecting the other results.  
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between one and two), 6.3% were ‘two-baggers’ (i.e. multiples between two and three), and the 
remaining 12.9% were at least ‘three-baggers’ (i.e. multiples of three or more).13 Broken up by fund 
type, we find that complete write-offs are much more common among venture funds (75.3%) than 
among buyout funds (37.8%), though buyout funds have many more losers (21.3% vs. 5.4%). This 
indicates that buyout investments – unlike venture investments – have some salvageable value even 
when they fail. Overall, the portfolio companies of buyout funds have somewhat larger average 
multiples (1.69 vs. 1.55), though the difference is not significant.  
Multiples are hard to interpret, as they ignore the time value of money: doubling one’s money over 
one year is better than doubling it over two years. Thus to assess the determinants of funds’ investment 
success rates, we convert multiples into annualized returns using the holding period data analyzed in 
Section 5.1.14 Among mature funds, the average investment-level return is –54.9%, reflecting the large 
number of portfolio holdings that are written off.  
A quirk of the data prevents us from calculating returns in excess of some benchmark. Consider an 
investment that is written off. We observe one or several dated cash outflows followed by no cash 
inflow. The multiple is zero and the return is –100%. The write-off date and so the length of the 
holding period are unknown, and thus we cannot calculate excess returns: without further information 
or assumptions, we don’t know over what period to measure the benchmark return. In the analysis that 
follows, we therefore concentrate on raw returns.15 For the same reason, we do not include variables 
that are dated at the time of exit (such as conditions in the IPO or M&A markets).16  
What determines whether a particular portfolio company performs well or poorly? Obviously, 
performance will have a large idiosyncratic component, driven by technology risk, the quality of 
execution, market acceptance, competitors’ reactions and so on. However, the framework proposed in 
this paper suggests that performance should also systematically be affected by changes in 
entrepreneurs’ demand for capital, funds’ ability to react by supplying capital at short notice, and 
competition for deal flow. Specifically, an improvement in investment opportunities should lead to 
                                                           
13 Our distribution of multiples is broadly consistent with Cochrane’s (2003) analysis of the fate of a sample of venture 
capital investments. Cochrane finds that 21.4% of the sample companies went public and 20.4% were acquired, with the 
remaining 58.2% classified as ‘out of business’ or ‘still private’.  
14 We lose some observations as holding periods cannot be computed for all successful investments. 
15 The correlation between investment returns and contemporaneous Nasdaq returns conditional on success is negative in 
eight of the twenty vintage years 1981-2000, especially among the 1980s vintages. Controlling for Nasdaq returns in the 
regressions reported below (which entails focusing on exited investments only) does not change our results. 
16 Such variables can obviously only be measured for exited investments, reducing the sample size substantially. 
Conditional upon exit, we find that conditions in the IPO market have a significantly positive effect on returns, using the 
proxies introduced earlier (results not reported). 
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higher returns for an existing fund that can satisfy the demand for capital before new PEFs enter the 
market. Conversely, tougher competition for deal flow should, all else equal, reduce performance.  
We test these hypotheses by regressing investment returns on proxies for investment opportunities 
and competition for deal flow, controlling for fund characteristics (venture vs. buyout, fund sequence 
number, and fund size), investment characteristics (size of investment and fund year in which it was 
undertaken), and market conditions (the corporate bond yield at the time of investment). Note that as in 
Section 5.1, the unit of observation in this analysis is a portfolio company rather than a fund. We pool 
venture-backed and buyout investments; results for each sub-sample are similar and are not reported. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on fund name (that is, investments undertaken by the same 
fund are not assumed to be independent). 
The regressions are estimated using ordinary least-squares17 which – in contrast to the duration 
models estimated so far – provides no easy way to correct for right-censoring: funds raised more 
recently are less likely to have reached the point where investments can be exited, so their portfolio 
companies are more likely to have returns of –100%.18 Therefore, we estimate the model over different 
samples, beginning with the investments held by funds raised in 1981-1993 (the mature funds in our 
dataset) and adding later vintage years one by one. As more vintages are added, sample size grows but 
the risk of right-censoring bias increases.  
Table 6 reports the estimation results. Adjusted R2 range from 7% to 12.7%, suggesting that much 
of the variation in performance is due to factors that we have not controlled for, including presumably 
idiosyncratic factors. Improvements in investment opportunities have the predicted positive effect on 
returns, and this is generally significant across regressions. Among mature funds, for example, a one-
standard deviation increase in the log number of companies funded in the same industry at the time a 
sample company received its first investment increases the average return by 19.8 percentage points, 
holding all other covariates at their sample means. Interestingly, we also find that investments made 
during the heyday of the new-economy boom in 1999-2000 subsequently had substantially lower 
returns. Note that the positive relation between investment opportunities and returns is consistent with 
the framework of Section 2 and the results of Section 5.1. That is, if existing PEFs are able to take 
                                                           
17 We obtain qualitatively identical results in probits of the likelihood of ‘success’ vs. ‘failure’, where ‘success’ is 
alternately defined as a multiple that exceeds 1, 2, or 3.  
18 Alternatively, one might consider estimating censored regressions (such as a Tobit). This is problematic for two reasons. 
First, we face the practical problem of which investments in our data have zero multiples (-100% returns) because they 
have been written off (so their true multiple is indeed zero), and which have zero multiples because we don’t observe them 
long enough for them to pay off (right-censoring). Second, censored regressions (unlike OLS) are not robust to departures 
from the assumption that the underlying distribution is normal (see Goldberger (1983)). Normality is not a good description 
of the distribution of investment returns. 
  
24
 
advantage of ‘sticky’ capital markets, then their returns on investment should reflect this competitive 
advantage. 
Tougher competition for deal flow, on the other hand, reduces returns as conjectured: the more 
money is available to a fund’s main competitors, and the more money is invested in the same industry, 
the lower are returns. To illustrate, a one-standard deviation increase in the amount invested in other 
companies in the industry reduces returns by 12 percentage points, using the estimates for vintage 
years 1981-1993. The interpretation of this result is that, holding investment opportunities fixed (as 
measured by number of companies funded), the increase in money chasing deals reduces returns by a 
considerable amount. Our finding also complements Gompers and Lerner’s (2000) analysis of the 
positive impact of capital inflows into venture funds on the ‘pre-money valuations’ of investments 
such funds undertake. Arguably, our results based on investment-level returns provide a clearer picture 
of the negative effect of competition on funds’ success rates, since Gompers and Lerner do not know 
what fraction of the equity VCs acquire in return for their investments.  
Taken together, our evidence of a relation between returns and both investment opportunities and 
competition strongly support the central hypotheses proposed in this paper. Note that Tables 3 through 
5 show that private equity fund managers time their investment and exit decisions in response to 
competitive conditions in the PEF market. A corollary of this is that the PEFs’ actions should be 
reflected in the success rate of these investments. Table 6 demonstrates that this is the case. 
6. Final Remarks 
What factors explain the investment behavior of private equity fund managers? This paper 
proposes a framework based on an imperfectly competitive market for private equity in which demand 
for private equity varies over time and the supply of private equity is ‘sticky’ in the short run. Increases 
in demand can, in the short run, only be met by existing funds which accelerate their investment flows 
and earn excess returns. Increases in supply lead to tougher competition for deal flow, and private 
equity fund managers respond by cutting their investment spending. Supply increases possibly indicate 
overheating accompanied by poorer performance (e.g., Kaplan and Stein (1993) and Gompers and 
Lerner (2000)).  
Using a unique dataset of private equity funds over the last two decades, we document evidence 
consistent with this framework by estimating the determinants of the draw down and exit decisions of 
funds’ investments throughout their life. Controlling for fund characteristics and market conditions, we 
show that the competitive environment facing fund managers plays an important role in how they 
manage their investments. During periods in which investment opportunities are good, existing funds 
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invest their capital and exit their investments more quickly, taking advantage of the favorable business 
climate. This tends to lead to better returns on their investments. In contrast, when facing greater 
competition from other private equity funds, fund managers draw down their capital more slowly and 
hold their investments for longer periods of time. Returns on investment undertaken when competition 
was tougher are ultimately significantly lower.  
The model of the private equity market described in this paper has implications for the literature on 
fund performance. Conditioning on PEF compensation being homogenous across funds, investors with 
access to funds that are in a position to take advantage of the stickiness of private equity capital should 
earn excess expected returns. Remaining investors earn normal risk-adjusted rates of return. The 
exception, however, is the set of investors who provide capital during overheated environments in 
which potentially ‘too much money chases deals’. These investors, of course, earn poor returns. 
Evidence presented in Table 6 supports this view at the individual investment level. Moreover, this 
model and the investment behavior of fund managers documented here coincide with the recent 
literature that provides evidence of the determinants of private equity fund-level performance (see, for 
example, Kaplan and Stein (1993), Gompers and Lerner (2000), Kaplan and Schoar (2003) and Jones 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), among others).  
But there are many questions that remain unanswered. For instance, does the cross-sectional and 
time-series distribution of PEF returns imply rational behavior on the part of investors? At a general 
level, this depends on investors’ ability to predict the current level of competition for PEF capital and 
forecast future periods of investment opportunities. Consider Kaplan and Schoar’s (2003) result that 
returns from follow-on funds are persistent and exceed those of first-time funds (also see our Table 6 
for similar evidence at the individual investment level). Investors may be acting rationally by investing 
in first-time funds to the extent that it provides them an option (perhaps not available to all investors) 
of investing in a follow-on fund if the PEF is successful. To fully address this issue, the results in this 
paper suggest one possible factor, namely the degree of competition in the market over the life of the 
fund. A complete answer, however, needs to incorporate the risk characteristics of the fund as well as 
the premium for liquidity (if any) which may vary across funds. 
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Figure 1. Draw down and distribution rates by fund year 
The figure shows average cumulative draw downs for each year of a fund’s life (counted from 1 to 10), divided by 
committed capital; average cumulative distributions divided by committed capital; and net capital gains (the difference 
between distributions and draw downs). The number of funds available for calculating these averages decreases over the 
fund years, as not every fund has completed a ten-year run of operation. The average fund draws down 16.28%, 20.35%, 
and 20.15% of committed capital in its first three years of operation. At the end of its fourth year, it is 72.64% invested, and 
at the end of its expected life (year 10) it is 93.62% invested. There are no further draw downs beyond year 10. It takes 
around seven years for committed capital to be returned. Funds sometimes have further distributions beyond year 10, which 
are not shown. 
 
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Draw downs
Distributions
Capital gains
Fund year
 
 
Fund year 
  
29
 
Table 1. Sample overview 
The sample consists of private equity and venture capital funds raised between 1981 and 2001 (the ‘vintage years’). To 
protect the identity of the Limited Partner, we have agreed not to disclose the number of newly raised funds the Limited 
Partner invested in after 1993. We refer to the 73 funds raised before 1993 as ‘mature’ funds. VC funds are those identified 
as ‘Venture Capital’ by Venture Economics. Most non-venture funds are flagged as ‘Buyout’ (90.4%); the remainder are 
flagged as ‘Generalist Private Equity’ (3.8%), ‘Mezzanine’ (4.8%), and ‘Other Private Equity’ (1%). Fund size is the 
capital committed by investors to a fund in all closings, as reported by Venture Economics and corrected by us where 
needed using partnership reports prepared by the fund managers. Total fund size is the aggregate amount raised by all 
sample funds. The ‘VE universe’ refers to all funds raised in the relevant sample period according to Venture Economics 
that are headquartered in the same countries as our sample funds (the U.S. and certain countries in Europe and Latin 
America). Commitment is the Limited Partner’s capital commitment to the funds. Total commitment is the aggregate 
commitment by the Limited Partner. Mean commitment is equally weighted. All monetary numbers are in nominal U.S. 
dollars.  
 
 1981-2001  1981-1993 
  all funds
buyout 
funds VC funds  all funds 
buyout 
funds VC funds
       
No. of funds * * * 73 54 19
        
Fund type       
 % that are VC funds (by number) 24.9    26.0   
 % that are VC funds (by fund size) 14.8    11.8   
        
Fund size ($m)        
 Total 207,011 176,443 30,568  36,704 32,381 4,322
 Mean * * *  502.8 599.7 227.5
 Median 367.5 452.0 200.0  233.0 271.5 75.0
        
% of VE universe covered (by capital) 17.5 29.3 6.3 20.2 27.7 3.7
        
Commitment ($m)        
 Total 5,459.4 4,772.0 687.5  1,107.0 1,020.8 86.2
 Mean * * *  15.2 18.9 4.5
 Median 10.0 12.5 5.0  7.0 10.0 3.2
        
Commitment/fund size (%)        
 Mean 4.7 4.1 6.6  4.6 4.2 5.9
 Median 3.3 3.2 3.7  3.7 3.4 5.6
        
Fund sequence number (as % of funds by number)      
 first-time funds  27.7 26.5 31.3 34.8 33.3 38.9
 second-time funds 21.0 23.0 14.9 18.8 21.6 11.1
 third-time funds 11.6 12.0 10.4 8.7 7.8 11.1
 later funds 39.7 38.5 43.3 37.7 37.3 38.9
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Table 2A. Draw downs by vintage year 
Fund managers typically draw down the limited partners’ capital commitment not when the fund is raised but when they wish 
to invest in a portfolio company. The average fund in our sample has drawn down 67.32% of committed capital. However, this 
understates draw downs as the more recent funds in the sample are not yet fully invested. Therefore, we also report draw down 
schedules for the 73 funds raised between 1981 and 1993.  
 
 All funds Buyout funds  VC funds 
Vintage 
Year 
No. of 
funds  
Average
draw downs /
committed
capital
Fraction of 
funds that are 
70% invested
Fraction of 
funds that are 
80% invested
Average 
draw downs / 
committed 
capital
Average 
draw downs / 
committed 
capital
            
1981-2001 * 0.6732 0.556 0.495 0.6671 0.6916
1981-1993 73 0.9474 0.959 0.890 0.9466 0.9498
           
1981 1 0.9991 1.000 1.000 0.9991 n.a.
1983 2 0.8973 1.000 0.500 1.0000 0.7947
1984 5 0.9688 1.000 1.000 1.0091 0.9085
1985 4 1.0112 1.000 1.000 1.0149 1.0000
1986 6 1.0003 1.000 1.000 1.0003 1.0000
1987 8 0.8654 0.750 0.625 0.8555 0.8819
1988 12 0.9780 1.000 1.000 0.9760 1.0000
1989 11 0.9517 1.000 0.909 0.9410 1.0000
1990 4 0.9217 1.000 0.750 0.8647 0.9787
1992 6 0.9027 0.833 0.833 0.8588 0.9904
1993 14 0.9462 1.000 0.929 0.9397 0.9627
1994 * 0.9313 0.938 0.875 0.9219 0.9969
1995 * 0.9101 1.000 0.923 0.8913 1.0133
1996 * 0.9016 0.944 0.889 0.8928 0.9321
1997 * 0.7632 0.618 0.441 0.6784 0.9668
1998 * 0.6511 0.400 0.400 0.6454 0.6786
1999 * 0.4119 0.100 0.025 0.3598 0.6201
2000 * 0.1906 0.000 0.000 0.1970 0.1785
2001 * 0.1831 0.000 0.000 n.a. 0.1831
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Table 2B. Capital distributions by vintage year  
Funds are typically ten-year limited partnerships, with possible extensions by a few years subject to the limited partners’ 
approval. Following liquidity events (such as an IPO), capital is returned to the limited partners in the form of cash or stock 
distributions. In the latter case, the LP may either sell the stock directly or hold it as a public market investment. We record 
only stock distributions that are sold (as virtually all are in our sample). At the end of the fund’s life, the general partner 
‘liquidates’ the fund by selling all remaining assets and distributing the cash to the limited partners. The liquidation phase can 
potentially take a few years. The panel shows average cumulative distributions divided by invested and by committed capital 
for all funds raised between 1981 and 2001, and 1981 and 1993, and by vintage year.  
 
 All funds Buyout funds VC funds 
Vintage 
Year 
No. of 
funds  
Average
distributions /
capital invested
Average 
distributions / 
committed 
capital
Average 
distributions / 
capital invested
Average 
distributions / 
capital invested
   
1981-2001 *  1.0683 0.9434 1.0307 1.1802
1981-1993 73  2.5913 2.4517 2.5639 2.6693
          
1981 1  3.2780 3.2751 3.2780 n.a.
1983 2  3.2168 2.9249 3.5901 2.8435
1984 5  3.0794 2.9797 3.5046 2.4415
1985 4  5.1357 5.1416 5.7111 3.4095
1986 6  3.8571 3.8577 3.7980 4.1528
1987 8  2.6453 2.3634 2.8899 2.2378
1988 12  2.0259 1.9661 1.9999 2.3123
1989 11  2.6084 2.4332 2.3998 3.5469
1990 4  1.9637 1.7902 1.6966 2.2308
1992 6  1.8777 1.6396 2.1632 1.3067
1993 14  1.9346 1.7836 1.4851 3.0584
1994 *  1.3123 1.1882 1.4227 0.5394
1995 *  1.2377 1.1478 0.9561 2.7868
1996 *  0.8367 0.7804 0.7657 1.0853
1997 *  0.5130 0.4348 0.3942 0.7982
1998 *  0.5966 0.4377 0.4547 1.2820
1999 *  0.1995 0.0918 0.2107 0.1546
2000 *  0.1187 0.0130 0.0849 0.1757
2001 *  0.0001 0.0000 n.a. 0.0001
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Table 3. The determinants of draw-down rates 
The dependent variable is the log of the time (in quarters) between a fund being raised and it having drawn down at least X% of 
its committed capital. We use three cutoffs for X: 70, 80 and 90%. The explanatory variables are listed in the table and 
discussed more fully in the text. We estimate accelerated-time-to-failure models using maximum likelihood estimators that are 
corrected for the right-censoring caused by funds leaving our sample before they are fully invested. We thus include all sample 
funds raised between 1981 and 2001 in the analysis. The error is assumed to have an exponential distribution with mean β0 (the 
constant). This model is identical to a proportional-hazard duration model, and coefficients can easily be converted into hazard 
ratios. The intercepts are not reported. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively. 
 
  All funds  
Buyout 
funds VC funds
Time to investing at least … 70% of 
committed 
capital 
80% of 
committed 
capital 
90% of 
committed 
capital 
 80% of 
committed 
capital 
80% of 
committed 
capital 
 
time-
varying?      
Investment opportunities       
log quarterly per-industry no. of companies funded  yes -0.797*** -0.942*** -0.770*** -0.895*** -0.762* 
  0.170 0.170 0.164 0.198 0.415 
dummy=1 if in 1999Q1 to 2000Q2 yes -1.441*** -1.071*** -0.705*** -1.018*** -1.149**
  0.235 0.235 0.250 0.273 0.529 
Competition for deal flow       
log real fund inflows, same vintage year no 0.737*** 0.772*** 0.366* 0.877*** 1.185***
  0.223 0.216 0.217 0.272 0.382 
log aggregate per-industry disbursement in first 3 yrs no 0.289** 0.384*** 0.453*** 0.213* -0.232 
  0.124 0.123 0.126 0.110 0.326 
trend = vintage year–½ (scaled to give 1981=1) no -12.552*** -9.294*** -8.482*** -14.503*** -8.433**
  2.532 2.193 2.334 3.548 3.997 
Fund characteristics       
dummy=1 if venture fund no 1.238*** 1.500*** 0.952***   
  0.323 0.318 0.307   
dummy=1 if first-time fund no 0.027 -0.009 -0.241 -0.261 0.370 
  0.194 0.206 0.215 0.224 0.456 
log real fund size no -0.028 -0.075 -0.043 -0.012 -0.079 
  0.075 0.081 0.089 0.092 0.162 
Cost of capital       
BAA corporate bond yield (in %) yes 0.773*** 0.721*** 0.589*** 0.945*** 0.634***
  0.114 0.108 0.110 0.145 0.238 
quarterly return on Nasdaq Comp. Index (in %) yes 0.009 -0.001 0.007 0.000 0.002 
  0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.013 
       
Pseudo-R2  22.5 % 25.3 % 21.7 % 25.3 % 29.7 % 
Likelihood ratio test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2)  113.4*** 120.8*** 97.4*** 91.0*** 34.4*** 
Number of observations (time at risk)  2,897 3,239 3,615 2,496  743 
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Table 4. The determinants of capital returns 
The dependent variable is the log of the time (in quarters) between a fund being raised and it having returned at least M times 
its committed capital. We use three cutoffs for M: 1x, 1.5x and 2x. The explanatory variables are listed in the table. We 
estimate accelerated-time-to-failure models using maximum likelihood estimators that are corrected for the right-censoring 
caused by funds leaving our sample before they are fully invested. We thus include all sample funds raised between 1981 and 
2001 in the analysis. The error is assumed to have an exponential distribution with mean β0 (the constant). This model is 
identical to a proportional-hazard duration model, and coefficients can easily be converted into hazard ratios. Intercepts are not 
reported. The intercepts are not reported. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively. 
 
  All funds  
Buyout 
funds VC funds
Time to returning at least … committed capital 1x 1.5x 2x  1x 1x 
 
time-
varying?      
Investment opportunities       
log quarterly per-industry no. of companies funded yes -1.558*** -0.639* -1.245*** -0.983*** -2.590***
  0.301 0.368 0.425 0.370 0.564 
dummy=1 if in 1999Q1 to 2000Q2 yes 0.221 -0.166 -0.454 -0.001 1.223 
  0.366 0.402 0.427 0.427 0.854 
Competition for deal flow       
log real fund inflows, same vintage year no 1.215*** 1.121*** 0.930*** 0.921*** 1.601***
  0.238 0.273 0.305 0.341 0.464 
log aggregate per-industry disbursement in first 3 yrs no 0.560** 0.134 0.563 0.355 0.792* 
  0.249 0.309 0.362 0.315 0.472 
trend = vintage year–½ (scaled to give 1981=1) no -8.933*** -8.533*** -9.408*** -11.998*** -7.246***
  2.308 2.529 2.966 3.585 3.442 
Fund characteristics       
dummy=1 if venture fund no 1.874*** 1.052** 1.124**   
  0.395 0.464 0.511   
dummy=1 if first-time fund no 0.285 0.141 -0.031 0.227 0.365 
  0.256 0.309 0.351 0.295 0.535 
log real fund size  no 0.084 -0.048 -0.070 0.086 0.088 
  0.097 0.118 0.140 0.115 0.191 
Market conditions       
BAA corporate bond yield (in %) yes 0.632*** 0.222 0.364 0.610*** 0.802**
  0.170 0.213 0.272 0.202 0.398 
quarterly return on Nasdaq Composite Index (%) yes -0.019** 0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.047***
  0.009 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.018 
log quarterly per-industry number of IPOs yes 0.278 0.277 0.271 0.269 0.473 
  0.170 0.204 0.227 0.220 0.310 
log quarterly per-industry number of M&A deals  yes -0.579** -1.322*** -1.086*** -0.730** -0.078 
  0.272 0.368 0.419 0.328 0.528 
       
Pseudo-R2  48.3 % 44.5 % 46.2 % 44.1 % 74.6 % 
Likelihood ratio test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2)  160.7*** 120.8*** 106.9*** 107.7*** 65.5*** 
Number of observations (time at risk)  5,207 5,647 6,011 3,926 1,281 
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Table 5. The determinants of holding periods 
The dependent variable is the log of the time (in quarters) between a fund investing in a given portfolio company and the fund 
distributing cash or stock to its LPs after exiting the investment (typically via an IPO or a sale). If the fund exits the investment 
in several stages, we use the first transaction date. Investments that are not exited by the earlier of the end of our sample period 
or the tenth anniversary of a fund’s creation are treated as right-censored, with appropriate modifications to the log-likelihood 
function. We thus include the investments of all sample funds raised between 1981 and 2001 in the analysis. The explanatory 
variables are listed in the table. We estimate accelerated time-to-failure models using maximum likelihood estimators. The 
error is assumed to have an exponential distribution with mean β0 (the constant). This model is identical to a proportional-
hazard duration model, and coefficients can easily be converted into hazard ratios. The intercepts are not reported. Standard 
errors, shown in italics, are adjusted for clustering on fund name (that is, investments undertaken by the same fund are not 
assumed to be independent). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 
time-
varying? 
 
All funds  
Buyout 
funds  VC funds
Investment opportunities      
log quarterly per-industry no. of companies funded yes -0.375***  -0.344*** -0.423** 
  0.105  0.122 0.216 
dummy=1 if in 1999Q1 to 2000Q2 yes -0.624***  -0.584*** -0.842*** 
  0.125  0.141 0.261 
Competition for deal flow      
log real fund inflows, same vintage year no 0.350**  0.335* 0.563** 
  0.150  0.201 0.236 
log real per-industry disbursements at time of investment no 0.184***  0.178*** 0.169** 
  0.031  0.033 0.086 
trend = vintage year–½ (scaled to give 1981=1) no -6.477***  -6.144*** -6.976*** 
  1.466  2.159 1.746 
Fund and investment characteristics      
dummy=1 if venture fund no 0.956***    
  0.206    
dummy=1 if first-time fund no -0.044  0.001 -0.038 
  0.152  0.180 0.257 
log real fund size  no 0.015  -0.024 0.141* 
  0.062  0.071 0.075 
log real investment cost  no -0.122***  -0.104** -0.232*** 
  0.037  0.042 0.065 
fund year in which investment was made (1 to 10) no 0.054  0.040 0.109 
  0.036  0.037 0.096 
Market conditions      
BAA corporate bond yield (in %) yes 0.524***  0.517*** 0.527*** 
  0.078  0.095 0.130 
quarterly return on Nasdaq Composite Index (%) yes 0.002  0.003 -0.002 
  0.003  0.003 0.007 
log quarterly per-industry number of IPOs yes -0.220***  -0.290*** 0.021 
  0.052  0.060 0.108 
log quarterly per-industry number of M&A deals yes -0.113  -0.159 -0.082 
  0.098  0.125 0.139 
Pseudo-R2  14.7 %  13.8 % 18.6 % 
Likelihood ratio test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2)  333.6***  290.9*** 118.6*** 
Number of observations (time at risk)  30,189  22,407 7,782 
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Table 6. Determinants of investment returns  
The dependent variable is the annualized return on investment for each portfolio company, defined as abs(cash 
inflows/invested capital) raised to the power (1/holding period), minus 1. The explanatory variables are listed in the table. We 
estimate ordinary least-square regressions over different samples, beginning with all funds raised between 1981 and 1993 (the 
mature funds in our dataset) and adding later vintage years one by one. Funds raised more recently are less likely to have 
reached the point where investments can be exited, so their portfolio companies are more likely to have –100% returns. 
Standard errors, shown in italics, are adjusted for clustering on fund name (that is, investments undertaken by the same fund 
are not assumed to be independent). We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), 
respectively.  
 
Vintage years: 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 
 to 1993 to 1994 to 1995 to 1996 to 1997 to 1998 
Investment opportunities       
log per-industry no. of companies funded 0.262*** 0.216*** 0.119* 0.079 0.088* 0.084** 
 0.069 0.068 0.062 0.055 0.046 0.041 
dummy=1 if investment made in 1999Q1 to 2000Q2 -0.878*** -0.629*** -0.551*** -0.373*** -0.192*** -0.096** 
 0.301 0.188 0.148 0.093 0.059 0.045 
Competition for deal flow       
log real fund inflows, same vintage year 0.091 0.010 -0.078 -0.079 -0.182*** -0.210***
 0.066 0.068 0.065 0.061 0.045 0.040 
log real per-industry disbursements at time of investment -0.104*** -0.095** -0.061* -0.052 -0.063** -0.066** 
 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.034 0.029 0.026 
trend = vintage year–½ (scaled to give 1981=1) -0.176 -0.177 -0.293 0.234 0.016 0.085 
 0.656 0.689 0.655 0.604 0.527 0.494 
Fund and investment characteristics       
dummy=1 if venture fund -0.558*** -0.556*** -0.514*** -0.465*** -0.512*** -0.521***
 0.097 0.100 0.094 0.083 0.065 0.057 
dummy=1 if first-time fund -0.152** -0.113* -0.078 -0.082 -0.051 -0.034 
 0.066 0.064 0.058 0.054 0.046 0.043 
log real fund size -0.006 0.022 0.032 0.024 0.023 0.015 
 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.015 
log real investment cost  0.039*** 0.031** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.032***
 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.009 
fund year in which investment was made (1 to 10) -0.047** -0.038* -0.022 -0.025 -0.032** -0.039***
 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.013 
Market conditions at time of investment       
BAA corporate bond yield (in %) -0.021 -0.007 0.002 -0.010 -0.024 -0.040** 
 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.023 0.020 0.019 
       
Adjusted R2 12.7 % 10.2 % 7.8 % 7.5 % 7.7 % 7.0 % 
No. of portfolio companies 1,257 1,462 1,618 1,874 2,284 2,744 
 
 
